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by Jay C. Andersen 1!
Utah is at the crossroads in water resources planning.

Qua"lity

of water, transfers in uses interbasin transfers, and use of our en t itlement in the Colorado River are among the important issues.

Ut ah is in

a position to exercise some control of water use policies and is doing
so.

In this short presentation, we can only call attention to some

issues where things may not always seem clear at first glance .

Hopefully

some thoughts can be presented to stimulate appropriate courses of action.
In economics we often refer to the fallacy of composition.
is the II fallacy of composition"?

What

The fallacy is, "What is true for the

individual or part is necessarily also true for the group or whole. "
Issue: Increased water supply to a farmer increases production so that
he rea 1i zes a qumper crop. The fa rmer lsi ncome is 1a rger than formerly
Therefore, if water supply is increased to all farmers, they will be
better off. This applies to farmers as a group..
Wrong .

Because price declines as total output goes up, and as

all farmers realize bumper crops, price is depressed.
overbalance the large output, farm incomes fall.

If price declines

Whether to t al income

rises or falls depends upon the price elasticity of demand for the
products; that is, the coefficient of change in relative quantity as

11 Paper presented at Blue Ribbon Committee on Water Planning of
the Utah State Legislature, Ap r il 18, 1978.
~I Professor and Head, Department of Eco nomics, Utah State University, Logan, Utah 84322.
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as compared to the relative change in price.

For most agricultural

products, the demand is inelastic so that price varies relatively more
than quantity.

Thus, as quantity is increased, price is forced down

relatively more so that total income to farmers falls.
That's an easy example.

It's plain to see the fallacy of

extending the finding beyond its logical limits.

In economics the

difference between the individual and the aggregate is distinguished
as micro-economics and macro-economics.
are less obvious.

Let's turn to some examples that

In water supply analysis, a systems approach provides

the macro view that avoids the fallacy of composition.
Issue:

Improvements in irrigation efficiency lead to increases in welfare.
Not necessarily.

Its

Begin with the concept of irrigation efficiency.

definition is the ratio of the amount of water consumptively used in

evapotranspiration of plants to the amount of water diverted .

Thus, the

higher the proportion of the diversion actually used up, the more efficient
the system.

The problem arises in the distinction of the incentive system

at the micro (farm) level and the results in a basin-wide context.

Individual

proprietors seek to increase their efficiency because their water right is
often defined in terms of the amount that they are authorized to divert
from the canal or stream.

They see the opportunity to (1) distribute water

more evenly and increase yields, and (2) irrigate more acres with a better
water supply because of careful husbandry.

They may do this by sprinkling,

improving canals and ditches, leveling the land, or simply applying more
intensive labor and management to the irrigation process.

As might be

expected, a smaller proportion of water diverted from streams and canals
returns to the downstream water flow.
In the Sevier River Basin in Utah, which is a closed asin, many
have said that the flow of the river is entirely diverted seven .times.
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The accuracy of this statement cannot be attested, but it seems to be
approximately true.

In the Sevier Basin when upstream users adopt improved

irrigation practices and irrigate more acres with a full-season supply, the
water suply to the lower basin becomes lessened.

This happens despite a

court decree that allocates portions of the flow to upper and lower basin
users.

Whether overall welfare is increased or decreased d?pends on

the relative values of the upstream and downstream uses and the cost of
the improvements.

As a certainty there arises an equity problem.

Legal

actions have become commonplace in the Sevier Basin.
It is a problem.

Farmers who want to improve irrigation say that

irrigation water rights are property rights.
they please with these rights.

They claim they can do as

They stress that not being able to expand

acreage reduces incentive to conserve water and become efficient.
But, what of the downstream user who also has a paten t ed water
right and a long-standing use of water coming from the upstream return
flows?

Is the water right less valid?

equity issue.

Only the courts can decide this

It is clear that any analysis of this water supply bearing

on the economic efficiency and equity of the situation must depend on an
overall system evaluation.
It is a commonly- held notion that substantial water 'Isavings" can
be achieved through more effic.ient water use and that the un needed Ilexcessil
could then be released back into the system to meet other demands.

While

this may be possible in certain situations, there are some serious flaws
in much of the simplistic thinking on the subject.
Careless application of efficiency criterion has led to misconceptions
fostering unrealistic and counterproductive policy recommendations.
example, one commonly hears statements such as:

For

lIif seepage from canals

and laterals could be reduced through improved conveyance efficiency, many
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acre feet of new water could be made available;" or, "if irrigation
efficiency could be increased just 5 percent, we would have enough
water to supply all our anticipated municipal and industrial needs."
Such statements are generally erroneous extrapolations of part icular or
point efficiency measurements which ignore the hydrologic uni t y of river
basin water systems.

Changing such efficiencies can alter the routing,

gua1ity, or timing of flow to downstream points; but they generally
have no substantial effect on the basin water supply volume.

Whether

changes in regimen or quality prove to be advantageous or disadvantageous
depends on the peculiar physiographic and demographic situation of the
river system.
When people talk about adopting practices that save water, the
under-lying concern is really to extend the utility of a supply to
accomodate additional needs of a wide variety of legitimate uses.

Yet

they often fail to consider the fact that utility (which invol ves economic,
quality, institutional, and legal dimensions, as well as physical) cannot
be measured by physical efficiency indices alone.

Efficiency terms permit

comparisons of practice but not comparisons of utility viewed in river
basin perspective.

Recommendations regarding transfer of water rights,

water pricing, recognition of social and economic values and externalities,
and incentive programs often exhibit a gross misconception of the public
impact of improved efficiencies.
Issue: Each of a group of farmers sell one-fourth of their direct flow
water rights for use in an energy development so that we expect a decline
in agricultural production.
Not necessarily.

In one case where this has happened, the power

company paid farmers perhaps 10 times the agricultural value for a portion
of the water right sold and has built a dam to store and regulate the flow
of the river.

This has provided for a season-long availability of water.
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Lined canals and other conveyances have been built to improve the
conveyance efficiency of the delivery system so that a greater proportion
of the water is actually delivered.

In summary, the water supply the

farmers have is more secure and in greater quantity, especially in
the late part of the year, than was formerly the case.

A cursory pre-

evaluation could have led to erroneous conclusions.
In most of Utah, flexibilities exist on maintaining agriculture
in addition to uses of water for power plant cooling.

Numerous possibilities

are usually available to use water more carefully by lining canals,
building storage reservoirs, application of water by sprinkling, and so
forth, to make the water extend to most, if not all of the area irrigated
before a power plant is located.

Probably the one major area in Utah

where only very expensive alternatives exist to maintain agriculture with
a power plant is in the Lower Sevier River Basin.

Interestingly enough,

this is the IPP proposed site as a back-up or alternate site to the muchcriticized Salt Wash location in Kane County.
The Lynndyl site is at the lower end of the river system.
Sevier River is thoroughly and efficiently used.

The

There is no alternative

way (excepting a long and expensive interbasin transfer) to avoid directly
taking land from agricultural production to obtain water for the plant.
Careful evaluation of this alternative should be made before accepting
the location.

Clearly, water cost and availability is not t he major

factor in power plant siting.
be critical.

However, impacts on other water users can

As evidence of the small concern with costs in energy

development, the following table illustrates the minor energy production
cost increases associated with a very large increase in

watel~

costs:
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Table 1.

Increase in Costs of Production for Energy Products
Cost Increases for a $200 per acre
Feet Increase in Price of Water

Water Use
Coal Gasification

2%-8%

Coal Liquefaction

1%-6%

Coal Fired Electical Generation

1%-2%
0.6%-1 %

Shale Oil
Coal Pipelines

2%-3%

Coa 1

0%

t~i

Source:

ni ng

Andersen, J. C. and J. E. Keith IIEnergy and the Colorado
River
Natural Resources Journal 17(2):157-168. April 1977.
ll

Clearly, if the people of Utah desire a voice in the water-use
policy decisions, they must exercise some polictical controls.

Commercial,

environmental, and national forces are apt to ignore the question of
alternative uses for water to concentrate on air, fuel availability and
other factors.
Issue: For energy projects it is proposed to adopt a IItotal containment"
po 1 icy for wa ter diverted to prevent the sa 1ty wa ter from returni ng to the
river in order to insure a higher quality water in the lower r eaches of the
river.
It may not work.

There are two parts to the quality problem.

measurement may be salt load, which is the total quantity
down the river in a dissolved state.

The

of salt flowing

Or, the measurement may be concentra-

tion, which indicates the proportion of salt to a given amount of water.
Each of these may be important depending on the particular concern i n
the downstream area.
In a river modeling study of the Colorado River, the results
suggest that as energy development with total containment proceeds
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through time, the total tons of salt load would decrease relative to the
base situation.

Compare lines 1 and 3 in Table 2.

As can be seen in

this table, the salt load would be decidedly higher with medium rather
than the higher energy utilization level which would lead to greater
flows.

The salt load would be small under high utilization and the

consequent low flow.
At the same time, salt concentration in the river would rise
with accelerated energy development.

The conclusion is that an inc r eased

rate of energy development would result in an increase in concentration
at Imperial Dam.

This effect is due to the reduced flows of water for

dilution particularly due to the anticipated total containment technology.
A situation which seems to escape some concerned parties is that water
returned from once-through cooling in the upper basin is likely of better
quality than the quality of water flowing in the lower basin.
Table 2.

Predicted Salinity Effects at Iltlpe l" ial Da m of Alte 'r'native Future
Uses in the Colorado River Basin

Assumed Flow
Million Acre
Fee t/Year

Utilization Level
Ag r i c. Energy Ex port

14

Medium Medium

r~ed

14

High

Medium

~1edi

14

Medium

High

14

M.edium

r~ed

So urce:

i urn

Salt Load
(Million
ton/yea r)
1977 1983 19902000

Salt
Concentration
(mg /1 )
1977 1983 19902000

i um

916

912

784

828

922

1090

urn

927

920

790

844

956

1162

Medium

916

905

755

828

928

1142

High

872

875

780

839

937

1097

Bisho p, A. B., J. C. Andersen , et. a 1 . "C olorado River Region al
Assessment Study," Prepared for Nationa l Commissioll on Water
Quality, Utah Water Research Laboratory , Uta h State Un iversity
Logan, Utah. Part 1, pp. 156-158 ,
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It appears that energy may have significant impacts on loca l and
regional water allocations and quality.

Upon whom the impacts fall will

depend to a great extent on institutional and economic constraints and
incentives which are imposed, either as a result of historical deve opment
or future policy directions.

It is not so clear that energy development

will be a detriment to either upstream or downstream users of the Colorado
River.
Investigations of the problem have lacked depth and a broad
systems perspective in many cases.

The case of the total

con ~ ainment

technology being represented to solve salinity problems is an examp l e.
If only one side (in this case the salt load) is considered, the answer
to the problem may be different than if other factors are brought to bear,
such as having water for dilution and the extra costs incurred.

A strong

objective look at the social, economic, and physical problem5 is suggested.
Some consideration might be given by Upper Basin states to attempt
to have water quality standards defined in terms of total
salts flowing in the stream.

to~s

of dissolved

Recent experience at EPA in Washington

suggests at least a possibility of defining pollution regulations in that
way.

Under those circumstances, any diversion taking water completely

out of the river, such as the Central Utah Project and totally contained
energy projects, also take out some amount of salts.

The ad'/antage to

accounting for salt load rather than parts per million is that water
taken out is high quality and would serve as a dilutant on the ppm
standard as the water moves downstream where quality is poorer.
of even high quality water also removes some of the salt load.

Removing
Thus, it

may be fairly easy for an upstream state to reduce the salt i oading in the
Colorado River.

The continuous process of distilling out the high quality

water makes it difficult to control the concentration.

_ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . . . . .1_ 1
. . . .. 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
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Issue: A closed groundwater basin that is recelvlng no recha r ge should
be most sparingly and carefully used to extend its life.
But, what about present value concepts in which any positive rate
of discount of the future makes income in the near term more valuable
than the same amount in the distant future?
is essentially a mine.

A closed gro undwater basin

Following Anthony Scott ~

the theory of the

mine can be represented as in Figure 1.
In this case, the value of the resource is not the same for
every unit extracted as it is for most minerals.
marginal productivity.

There is declining

Notice that either too rapid or two slow rate

of resource withdrawal is inefficient as defined by the difference between
total revenue and total cost or the profit curve.
In Figure 1, A is the rate of maximum current profit per
acre foot of water and B indicates the maximum profit per irrigation
season.

These two rates define the range of relevant values.

what is the optimum?

Now,

Clearly, if those who control the water have

only one more year or season after which they can withdraw no more
water, then the appropriate rate is B, the maximum profit of the year.
If there is no discount on future income and if the amount of the reserves
and present and future costs and prices are all known, then profit per
acre foot should be maximized at A.

But, to maximize the present value

of the resource, future profits must be discounted.

Any rate of interest

above zero induces owners of the water to shorten the life of the groundwater mine.

Thus, operators increase the rate of extraction toward B,

the maximum rate of profit per season.
Let us now introduce the concept of user cost.
have UC and UC'.

In Fi gure 2, we

UC' is at a higher rate of discount than UC.

User cost

- 3/
- Scott, Anthony T. 1970. The theory of the mine under conditions
of certainty. In: Mason Gaffney (ed) Extractive Resources and Taxation.
Johns Hopkins Press.
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1?I,t

,

\

Figure 1.

The Theory of the t~ ine Relating Various Economic Variables
to Rate of Extraction

11

"1",rfHf'" ....

R.fe l>f

p"..J./r
PQ\'"

/lc.r e
~.oT

,

I

,4C D

Figure 2

,

.

The Effect of a Change i n Discount Rate on User Cost and the
Optimal Rate of Extraction
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is defined as the present value of profits foregone by a decision to use
a unit of water today.

Note that with a higher discount rate, less future

profit is foregone by using the resource today.

Thus, as rate of discount

is increased, the optimal rate of extraction increases from C to D.

In

each case this represents the maximum difference between the profit
curve and user cost.
maximum conservation.

Thus, the wa ter users a re not mati va ted toward
In this case, like others, high interest rates

(discounts on the future) discourage conservation and preservation.
Issue: A drought 'comes where a city has first rights to the surface
water. Downstream irrigators can have what's left over. Put a brick
in the toilet, shower with a friend, and save water. We must conserve.
That's the usual compaign.

But let's look at it.

In the city of

Logan, Utah, and several others in the Mountain West and elsewhere, the
city water comes from surface flows and flows downhill to the city.

The

water that goes to the city is used both inside and outside the house.
Water that stays in the pipes (inside use) goes back through the sewer
and treatment facilities and is returned to the river.

There is no

evidence that water is lost by going through toilets, showers, tubs, and
sinks.

Of course, water consumptively used in lawns and gardens does not

return to be used for irrigators.

Credibility has been lost by well-

meaning people campaigning for conservation inside.
see through the shallowness of such arguments.
,

.

there is no danger.

Most thinking people

Better not cry wolf when

We see again that conservation by saving is re l evant

only for stock-type resources.

Purely flow resources cannot be saved.

Issue: Water for irrigation is worth about the same wherever . it is used
in Utah, so it doesn't matter where it is applied.
It is probably true that many visualize the value of water as
being rather low when

us~d

for irrigation.

Some areas that are relatively

short on water have high values for additional increments of water; others
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have low values.

The followi ng table gives approximate values.

may be a useful guide for allocating water.

These

Of course, cost of delivery

is also important.
Quantity of Water Used for Irrigation and Value of Marginal
Product by Region in Utah at Present Level of Use.

Table 3.

Quantity of Water
Region

Diverted

Consumed

Value of Marginal Product
Diverted

Consumed

Great Salt Lake Desert

105

50

8.20

14.00

Bear River

623

212

3.40

9.80

Weber

610

224

1 .54

4.19

Jordan

713

278

2.85

7.45

Sevier

870

282

7.33

22.58

Cedar--Beaver

136

61

11 .28

26.00

Uintah

789

293

1 .95

5.26

West Colorado

303

113

3.62

9.66

Southeast Colorado

146

29

1 .81

9.10

68

34

9.42

18.81

4,363

1 ,576

Lower Colorado
TOTAL

Issue: Most studies indicate that the value of water in basins like the
Sevier and Colorado is highest in downstream areas where climate is
milder and selection of crops and yields are greater.
That mayor may not be true. In an earlier piece of researchil
we divided the Sevier Basin into four parts from Area I upstream, to
Area 4 downstream.

Considering physical basin characteristics, return

~/Hiskey, Harold H.. Jay C. Andersen, and David L. Wilson, Some
upstream-downstream conflicts in water rights transfers. Paper presented
at joint meetings of American Agricultural Economics Association, Western
Agrricultural Economics Association, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, August 10-12.
1973.

-

-- -

---~-.

--------

- ---_.------_.
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flows from the southern and eastern parts of Area I can be diverted
again in that area, near Circleville and Kingston, then twice more in
Area II, and once in Area IV.

Return flows from diversions in Area III

can be diverted in area II once and once in Area IV.

Thus, using the '

constant consumptive use values of water found previously for each area,
values per acre foot at point of first diversion can be estimated by
multiplying the area use efficiency factor times the proportion of the
acre foot of transfer diverted times the value of consumptive use water
for the area, and are computed as follows:
Area I = 28 X 100 ($16) + 28 X 72 ($16) + 38 X 52 ($22)
+ 38 X 32 ($22) + 45 X 20 ($23)

= 16.81

Area II = 38 X 100 ($22) + 38 X 62 ($22) + 45 X 38 ($23) = 17.47
Area III

= 38 X 100 ($13)

+ 38 X 62 ($22) + 45 X 38 ($23)

= 14.05

Area IV = 45 X 100 ($23) = 10.35
Note that the physical use efficiency was estimated to be 38, 38, and 45
percent for Areas I to IV respectively.

Also the value of an incremental

acre foot of water consumed is $16, $22, $13, and $23 per acre foot for
each area.
The values of water obtained from this analysis would suggest that
for maximizing economic efficiency of use, consumptive use of water should
be transferred from Area IV back up the river.
,

.

Water that is consumptively

used by irrigation in Area I has the complementary effect of the precipitation which falls on the irrigated land.

It seems clear that in this

basin as well as many others, the precipitation is greater and the water
demands to mature crop are less in the upper, higher elevation parts
of the basin than in lower basin areas.

In this study, the values for

water take into account this complementary value from precipitation.
However, we are not sure what values arise when water is transferred
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because the water in the new area may be placed on already partially
irrigated land or on present dry land.

Furthermore, the value of the

dry crop or grazing when water is removed is not well known.

All that

we are quite sure of is that the complementary relationship is stronger
upstream.

And, we find that if the water is diverted first in Area I,

then about 90 percent arising there can be consumptively used throughout
the system.

If water available in Areas II and III is first diverted

in those areas, then about 79 percent of water can be eventually used.
If the first diversion is in Area IV, then only 45 percent is used in
the system;and the remainder escapes.
Much the same kind of analysis could be applied to tne Colorado
Basin.

Clearly the return flows are great in the upper basin and rare

or non-existent in the lower basin.

Much of the argument on higher value

Lower Colorado uses could be defused with this kind of argument.
Issue: Farmers receive an immense subsidy from federal irrigation water
developlileflt projects. Society should recapture this winafall and
glve it to all the people.
This is a widely-held misconception that underlies the proposed
rules on the 160-acre limitation regulations.

The facts are that we need

to consider that farmers as a group suffer when more producers come into
production.
to pay.1I
I,

The government calculates water rates on the

ba~;is

of liability

There is no contention that the irrigation purpose in reclamation

projects is profitable directly.
if it were so, but it is not.

Perhaps it would be more appropriate

No farmer or group of farmers would under-

take water development at usual costs of federal projects.
not begin to pay this full price.

They could

The subsidy is ultimately to consumers

who receive a wider variety of food items at a cheaper price .

Costs for

irrigation are usually offset by power reserves.

." ._wma:

U J .-
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The object of concern is that federal projects built many years
ago continue to sell water at a low price.
But, what if we had not had inflation?

Some feel this is unfair.

No one back then could see the

great technological advances that made it so ef f icient to dea l with large
acreages.

In any case, the current land holders are usually not the

original owners.

In most cases, if water is priced low, this has been

capitalized into higher prices for land.

So, current owners acting in

good faith on the behavior of the Bureau of Reclamation in not enforcing
the acreage for many years have paid the full price.
It is now much too late to extract any alleged windfalls.

Consumers

and landowners would be dealt a great injustice if the situati on were rolled
back to the primitive conditions implied by the 1902 law that was based
on the homestead provisions.

Things are not like that any more.

Issue: Power costs for irrigation pumping are becoming so hLgh
operators may be forced out of business.
This is a valid concern.
costs.

tha~

We are doing a study of irrigation water

Surface irrigation water is often provided for $1, $1.75, or even

$3 per acre.

These costs are quite reasonable.

On the farm that I own,

the cost is $6 per share in West Cache Irrigation Company.
somewhat higher.

This is

In our case, a share is about enough for an acre.

Our study of energy . costs for pumping in major irrigation pump
areas indicates the following energy costs for pumping each acre foot of
,

\

water:

17
Table 4.

Energy Costs for Pumping Each Acre Foot of Water
Area
Beryl-Enterprise

Pa rowan
1975

1976

Highest Cost

$20.51

$19.17

Average Cost

7.45

9.35

Lowest Cost

1 .96

1 .87

1975

1976

25.90
$
Power Source
(1 )
(2)
4.09
6.93

$ 17.79
Power Source
(2)
(1 )
4.05
9.53

1 .69

1 .56

Of course, there are many other costs of pumping.

In terms of

the values of water noted earlier, it is apparent that some operators are
unable to pay for water at the price it is costing them.

As energy costs

may continue upward, more serious problems confront us.
Perhaps we have tried to cover too many issues in this session.
You may wish to probe deeper into some of them.

We in the Economics

Department at Utah State University welcome an opportunity to be of
service by helping provide information to the policy-making process.
contend that many problems require a systematic look at many problem
facets beyond the superficial level.

We

